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If we allow ourselves to conceive of 
architecture as a practice that, in the 
broad sense of the term, is opposed as 
much to ‘the profession’, with its various 
regulations and hierarchies, as it is 
to ‘the discipline’, with its obsession 
for self-replication and sycophantic 
advancement, we open a space to 
question architecture’s potential adaptive 
capacity. Adaptation, as the active 
realisation of an individual, community 
or group’s adaptive capacity, can hereby 
be understood less as an indexical 
relation to changing conditions, and 
more fundamentally as an ambition of 
the practice as such. That is, adaptive 
capacities are driven by challenging what 
is assumed to be given in any situation. 
Architecture, in this conception, is both 
in and of the world, one with a rapidly 
changing climate; indeed, how the 
practice of architecture learns to adapt 
among these changing climatic conditions 
will determine its role in the various 
political economic struggles pressurised 
by our contemporary ecological and 
metropolitan hypercomplexity. Were 
the practice of architecture to assume 
these climatic changes as given, instead 
of conceiving of them as the aggregate 
result of a multi-centered, multi-scaled 
anthropogenic assemblage, it would 
forfeit its adaptive capacity. Alternatively, 
when the practice of architecture 
unfolds its adaptive capacity in relation 
to contemporary hypercomplexities, 
several of its most cherished but least 
examined conceptual alibis must be 
challenged. To advance such a challenge, 
we believe that Foucault’s assessment, 
in the epigraph above, offers several 
important points of departure. To develop 
practices that explore the political 
agency of other-than-affluent alliances – 
practices committed to the full potential 
of non-dominant political economic 
realities – we see Foucault’s reframing 
of the relationships among practices of 
liberty, social relationships and spatial 
distributions as fundamental to the work 
of architecture. 
In our research, it is necessary to 
challenge the dominant alibi of 
environmentalism in architecture, which, 
having doubtlessly been addressed 
across a wide number of projects 
and practices for at least forty years, 
nevertheless remains caught up within 
a hierarchical, opaque and ultimately 
illusory standard of sustainability 
that is frequently connected to a form 
of cultural elitism and well-intended 
liberal gestures. Adapting the concept of 
environmentalism in architecture practice 
requires that the spatial distributions 
implied by discourses on the environment 
be assessed not only according to the 
logic of inhabitation as performance and 
occupancy as optimisation, but, more 
fundamentally, in relation to temporalities 
of violence. To provoke such an adaptive 
rethinking, the activist writings of Rob 
Nixon offer an uncompromising trajectory 
of approach. To begin to account for the 
often intangible effects of ‘slow violence’, 
Nixon distinguishes this concept from 
earlier theories of structural violence.1 
In his words, ‘Structural violence is a 
theory that entails rethinking different 
notions of causation and agency with 
respect to violent effects. Slow violence, 
by contrast, might well include forms 
of structural violence, but has a wider 
descriptive range, calling attention 
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to broader, more complex categories 
of violence enacted slowly over time.’2 
Nixon goes on to connect this reading 
of slow violence to the deep time of 
geology and the evaluation, within 
geologic and stratigraphic science, of 
the Anthropocene thesis, although it 
is equally connected to what might be 
called the ‘attritional catastrophes’ 
brought about by climate change.3 
This is not least because the slow but 
relentless accumulation of violence 
wrought by climate change, which is 
characterised by unequal exposure to 
risk and disproportionate pressures of 
vulnerability, is inflicted most severely 
on the urban poor. In this regard, we 
agree with Nixon that ‘the fate of 
environmentalism – and more decisively, 
the character of the biosphere itself – 
will be shaped significantly in decades 
to come by the tension between what 
Ramachandra Guha and Joan Martínez-
Alier have called “full-stomach” and 
“empty-belly” environmentalism’.4 
The question for architecture practice 
and its potential adaptive capacities 
is thus whether the ‘full-stomach’ 
environmentalism of eco-design and 
liberal-minded sustainability can be 
thought of as an adequate response to 
the politics of hunger and thirst that are 
made increasingly dire by the extreme 
weather events, repeated resource 
shortages and dramatic floods that shape 
the lives of the urban poor in  
the global south.
The spatial distribution of environmental 
risks and benefits are also manifest in the 
reality and potential of social relations. 
In our research, the examination of such 
relations within Jakarta begins with 
a consideration of the contemporary 
pressures for urban development. Of 
course, this is by no means limited to 
architectural discourse, even if the 
iconic images of metropolitan progress 
are so often delivered by contemporary 
architecture firms. In this regard, the logic 
of development is as malicious as it is 
inescapable; development is a ubiquitous 
concept that is readily accepted as a 
natural given. Of this assumed given 
condition, questions worth posing are: 
Since when has development become the 
goal of capitalist investment? And how 
has this goal been articulated through its 
opposing term, underdevelopment? What 
began as early as 1949, with a speech 
by then US president Harry Truman on 
the need for affluent nations to address 
the so-called underdevelopment of 
less affluent states (notice how, in this 
speech, the term development begins 
to replace the term imperialism), has 
grown into a global project of reducing 
heterogeneous forms of social life to 
potential economic resources. The 
political dimension of development is 
thus related to its tendency to reduce 
the variegated social field to a more 
coherent, recognisable and formal series 
of designations that can be counted 
and traded – that is, accumulated as 
capital. The contemporary skyline of any 
major megacity can thus be understood 
as a series of inhabitable Trojan Horses 
with designer shells, the occupants 
of which enjoy the luxuries of high-
rise dwelling only as a residual effect, 
while the primary effect of these major 
developments is the accumulation of 
profit by the development  
firms themselves. 
The Trojan Horse effect of urban 
development has also been championed 
as a solution to urban poverty by the 
neoliberal economist Hernando de Soto. 
De Soto’s argument is as simple as it 
is deceptive: because the urban poor 
typically do not have a ‘proper title’ to 
their land or dwelling, these assets are 
trapped as ‘dead capital’.5 The liberation 
of this dead capital, then, requires 
the formalisation of property rights 
and material assets so as to enable 
their potential value to be realised as 
investment collateral. De Soto’s alleged 
solution to the mystery of capital is thus 
to introduce a more formidable and 
uniform structure of financial debt by 
homogenising the social relations of the 
urban poor into formalised, accountable 
proprietary assets against which money 
for development can be borrowed. 
Among the legions of critics who have 
contested this logic, Mike Davis has 
clearly described how this formalisation 
of physical assets as property would 
significantly disadvantage the poorest of 
the informal settlements by forcing them 
to compete within a formalised market 
economy, and would therefore exacerbate 
the most violent forms of urban poverty. 
The question of adaptive capacities 
with respect to architecture splits here 
in two directions. First, it is necessary 
to question the role of architecture as 
the iconography of development; this 
problematisation would certainly involve 
a concerted, long-term effort, which 
would itself require a fundamental 
rethinking of architectural pedagogy 
and apprenticeship, in addition to a 
substantial reappraisal of the philosophy 
of the city itself. Second, for architecture 
to advance a more robust concept of the 
city that could contest the developmental 
violence of contemporary neoliberalism, 
it is imperative to engage more fully 
with the discourse of ‘informality’, since 
it is this heterogeneous and difficult-
to-formalise series of social relations 
that are so often the target of urban 
development policy and its accumulation 
through dispossession (again, frequently 
under the dubious logic of correcting 
urban ‘underdevelopment’). 
We are far from alone in attending to the 
spatial distributions and social relations 
at stake in informal settlements, even 
if we prefer to use the somewhat more 
awkward locution ‘difficult-to-formalise’ 
as a designation for the spaces and 
relations in the kampungs of Jakarta.6 
While recognizing the need to develop the 
problem of informality more substantially, 
presently it is valuable to note that the 
prefix in- of the word informal operates 
according to a logic similar to the prefix 
under- in the term underdevelopment. 
In both cases, the designation itself is 
often sufficient to warrant some form 
of concern or intervention on the part 
of state authorities, financial investors, 
or some motley aggregate of both. 
What is occluded in such a missionary 
approach to formalising the difficult-
to-formalise, and thus making possible 
an accumulation of profit, is that 
these social relations are themselves 
already highly structured, organised 
and coherent. They help distribute the 
space of the kampung across ethnicities 
and generations, affecting spatial 
logics, temporal affinities, familial 
connections, and modalities of relation 
that are, quite simply, nonexchangeable. 
In her recent essay ‘Informality and its 
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Discontents’, Fran Tonkiss explains this 
nonexchangeable or irreducible aspect of 
difficult-to-formalise social relations in 
the following terms:
Economic strategies of self-help 
frequently rely on social networks to 
access resources, including credit, 
information, land, physical capital, 
protection, labor, or work opportunities. 
The informal mobilization of social capital 
allows people to find work, make space, 
borrow money, stay safe, and acquire 
goods in a way that would not be possible 
if individuals had to rely on such formal 
networks as credit unions, consumer and 
labor markets, formal private and public 
housing, and police and welfare systems.7
While we would tend to avoid the 
discourse of social capital, our 
inclination is to agree with Tonkiss’s 
prescient assessment of the productive 
heterogeneity of difficult-to-formalise 
social relations. This is not least because 
Tonkiss’s emphasis on the multiplicity of 
meshwork relationships helps to remind 
the architect that her most politically 
potent actions could be those that help 
defend the realities of heterogeneous 
social relations, rather than replacing 
them with the monotonous dead capital 
of new superblocks that tend to scrape 
away the settlements of the urban 
poor long before they ever scrape the 
sky. Still, it remains important to note 
that the specificity of these complex, 
heterogeneous social relations include 
forms of violence and coercion that 
cannot be easily dismissed; additionally, 
the very conception of autonomy at stake 
in readings of informal social relations 
is also a matter of continuing debate. 
Deferring for the moment the particular 
subtleties of this discussion regarding 
the autonomy of the urban poor, we can 
still productively move on to examine the 
discourse of autonomy as it has appeared 
within the field of architecture. 
As if caught in a perpetual refrain 
between an illustrious past and 
a condemned future, the concept 
of autonomy within contemporary 
discussions of architecture tends 
to return to the reactionary claims 
issued by architects in the mid- to late 
twentieth century, which suggested the 
social forces acting on the practice of 
architecture were ultimately peripheral 
and, ipso facto, negligible. Fortunately, 
even within the discipline, this bad 
infinity reiterating a reductive discourse 
of autonomy has witnessed important 
moments of contention, Pier Vittorio 
Aureli’s recent book The Project of 
Autonomy not least among them.8 Aureli 
develops a reading of the Greek-French 
philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis, who 
closely examined the complex origins of 
the idea of the autonomy of the subject 
in relation to technological developments 
in the European Enlightenment. Aureli 
explains that, according to Castoriadis, 
the period from the European 
Enlightenment (1750) to the so-called 
sunset of totalitarianism (1960) ‘was 
characterized by the convergence of two 
beliefs: in the autonomy of the subject, 
and in the unlimited expansion of the 
rationality implicit in technological 
development. … [R]ationalism was a 
mentality immediately appropriated and 
forwarded by the expanding and totalizing 
reach of capitalism.’9 Aureli continues: 
‘Indeed, capitalism was not simply a 
process of accumulation, but a scientific 
understanding of capitalism’s continuous 
innovation, its incessant revolution of 
production, consumption, and finance. 
For Castoriadis, capitalism in this way 
incarnated a new social imaginary, 
predicated on the unlimited expansion 
of rational mastery of the modes of 
accumulation.’10 Aureli’s ‘project’ is 
therefore an excavation of the concept 
of political autonomy as it developed 
in the writing of Mario Tronti and, more 
broadly, in Italian Operaism (Workerism) 
and Autonomism in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Through this excavation, he demonstrates 
a trajectory within the discourse of 
autonomy typically excluded from 
architecture altogether. More precisely, 
for Aureli the project of autonomy that 
leads from European Enlightenment 
thinkers such as Immanuel Kant all the 
way to the Italian Autonomia movement 
is a project of reassembling the relation 
between the imagined ‘autonomous’ 
subject and his rational, technological 
determinism. For Aureli then, the 
autonomy of politics – the irreducibility 
of the political dimension of human 
life – is, in fact, the permanent, ongoing 
negotiation of the ‘subject’ as such. The 
subject, whether conceptualised as 
autonomous or structurally conditioned, 
is thus the outcome of a process of 
negotiation that is necessarily political. 
Returning to the question of adaptation, 
then, we can postulate the following 
preliminary formulation: the imagined 
autonomy of the European Enlightenment 
subject, like the imagined autonomy of 
architecture, is itself the outcome of 
politics, not its precondition. From this 
perspective, we assert that the autonomy 
of architecture can only be conceived in 
terms of relations of power that make it 
fundamentally social and political, and 
therefore entirely imbricated in a multi-
centered, multi-scaled world within 
which it must negotiate, and renegotiate, 
its position as a practice of liberty. In 
our view, autonomy is not the goal of 
architecture, but the precondition for 
the development of its adaptive capacity 
within the world. 
To more fully open up the three 
conceptual backformations of autonomy, 
development and environmentalism 
to a more radical reconsideration, we 
need to understand how architecture 
operates within conditions of postnatural 
hypercomplexity. Specifically, our 
research considers those spaces in the 
city of Jakarta where water dramatically 
pressurises the relationships among 
human actors, infrastructural systems, 
and the various material agencies that 
mediate both everyday life and emergency 
situations. As architects, we examine 
how water acts socially, politically, 
and physically. In order to position the 
potential agency of architecture in 
Jakarta, it is worth staging the context of 
the water politics central to the project 
of Architecture + Adaptation. To do so, we 
offer one especially compelling example 
to demonstrate how water shapes the 
practices of liberty, the social relations 
and the distribution of space, all of 
which, in their co-constitutive relations, 
provoke the question of how architecture 
practices can develop more lithe and 
responsive adaptive capacities. 
On 26 January 2013, major floods were 
predicted for Jakarta. It was the height 
of the rainy season and rainclouds were 
moving south toward the city, which had 
already been inundated for most of the 
month, with many areas operating in fits 
and starts under the strain of enduring 
flood conditions. The city governor 
declared a state of emergency, and 
100,000 people were evacuated from 
their homes. The impending precipitation 
happened to coincide with the rise of a 
full moon, whose influence allows the 
tides to reach their peak height, at which 
point they tend to break the shoreline 
and reach deep into the north end of the 
city. In addition to these atmospheric and 
cosmic forces, Jakarta’s location within 
a shallow delta, which fills with water 
during heavy rainfall due to the drainage 
of the mountains to the south, further 
exacerbated the state of emergency. 
This geologic condition, expedited by 
the impervious surfaces that constitute 
the extensive urban footprint and thus 
increase the flow of water into the city, 
meant that on this day the water of 
the banjir (flood) would come from all 
directions at once.
Firdaus Ali, a hydrological engineer from 
the Universitas Indonesia, predicted 
the worst floods of the year with an 
announcement that resounded in the 
media and struck a note of fearful 
anticipation throughout the city. 
According to Ali, the floods would likely 
be worse than those of 2007, when 
over 200,000 residents of Jakarta 
were displaced. The recently elected 
populist city governor, Joko Widodo, 
tried to comfort the city with claims 
that he could divert the rain before it 
would reach the burdened and largely 
dysfunctional canal system. He had 
already taken extraordinary measures in 
declaring a state of emergency, and he 
would do so again; this time, the Agency 
for the Assessment and Application 
of Technology (BPPT), who had been 
‘waging a war’ against the rain, were 
to use emergency measures to dump 
salt, from ageing warplanes, into the 
approaching storm clouds before they 
reached the city. Salt, a desiccant, would 
draw the moisture from the clouds and 
cause it to rain over the ocean before 
the precipitation hit the city. With this 
proposal, the anticipation of banjir 
connected the present emergency 
to the mythical past as the power 
of the governor was extended to the 
atmosphere, whereby he would combat 
the unholy alliance of atmospheric, 
cosmic and geologic forces through a 
fleet of airplanes indicating the modernity 
of the Indonesian military.11
It did not rain on 26 January; it remains 
unclear whether the salt bombs were 
effective or whether other, less tangible 
forces changed the rainclouds’ course. 
However, on the verge of this banjir, the 
typically unconsidered infrastructure of 
the city – its obscure network of canals, 
drainpipes and sewers, and all the small 
pieces of city life that often lay unnoticed 
and overlooked – was connected to the 
cosmos. A sewer was suddenly connected 
to the gravitational pull of the moon; a 
canal was related by its proximity to the 
geology of the nearby mountains; and 
pipes that would have doubtlessly been 
overwhelmed were potentially spared 
through an act of atmospheric warfare. 
The impending evacuation of residents 
in the north was similarly linked to this 
cosmological event. While inundation is 
typical in the north, this time the water 
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so persistently inundated other parts 
of the city that it forced the experience 
of banjir across a larger spatial territory 
and broader social range, from the north 
all the way down to the more affluent 
southern and eastern edges of the city. 
This new territory of experience suddenly 
made the water politics of Jakarta, by 
way of a vast and continued inundation, 
sensible. This redistribution of the 
sensible, then, connected the reality 
of banjir to the urban poor as well as 
the middle and professional classes, 
challenging the modes of inhabitation 
and settlement across classes and  
income levels. 
If we required a localised metaphor for 
the reality of global climate change, a 
more exemplary case would be difficult 
to find. Nevertheless, it is necessary to 
remember that, despite the common 
experience of banjir occasioned by the 
allied forces of atmosphere, geology and 
cosmos, the affected residents of the 
city do not share the same capacities for 
responsive action. Unequal exposure to 
risk is a condition of city life in Jakarta 
that is not easily erased, even by the 
worst flood conditions. In this regard, 
flooding, like climate change, makes the 
unequal exposure to environmental risks 
and benefits a matter of politics. 
Celebrations of economic prosperity 
in Southeast Asia are necessarily 
politicised by focusing attention on 
the inequalities that persist alongside 
the varying trends of financial growth, 
increased exports and other measures 
of disproportionate accumulation.12 
While financial excitement about a 
‘world-class’ Jakarta follows closely 
the development of the World Bank–
funded ‘Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation 
Project’, with its promise of delivering 
increasing speculative attention to 
Indonesian markets, the question of 
what kind of affinities, solidarities and 
support structures can be developed 
to prevent these economic trends from 
simply reifying the division between 
extravagant affluence and extreme 
poverty must be asked now – and this 
question must be asked by architects.13 
Here, the work of the architect is also 
part-translator, part-analyst, part-
negotiator and part-intercessor who, 
among the forces of financialisation as 
urbanisation that efface capacities for 
self-determination among the urban 
poor, asserts her practice as decisively 
political. Our contention is that the 
future of hypercomplexity in Southeast 
Asian megacities will witness either a 
reification of political economic divisions 
between the extremely affluent and the 
neglected urban poor, or, as our research 
platform attempts to do, begin to develop 
new affinities between urban researchers, 
architects, landscape architects and the 
urban poor, to challenge the inequalities 
of resource availability, unequal exposure 
to environmental risks and benefits, and 
urban health and wellbeing. Among the 
various postnatural systems and social 
relations pressurised by the slow violence 
of climate change and the vicissitudes 
of financial speculation, we offer these 
matters of concern as areas  
of consideration for other designers who 
are likewise attempting to shape  
their practice in such a way that allows 
for a greater attention to, and interference 
in, the conditions of everyday life among 
urban struggles for self-determination, 
mutual aid, and spatial and  
environmental justice.
ARCHITECTURE, ADAPTIVE CAPACITIES, AND THE 
FUTURES OF HYPERCOMPLEXITY
UNCHARTERED TERRITORIES BOBBETTE/ MILLER / TURPIN
